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The African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET), an Accra-based nonprofit 
organization, promotes policy and institutional reforms for sustained growth and 
transformation in Africa. It engages in policy research on structural transformation issues, 
performs advisory services and institutional strengthening of African economies, 
champions an informed African perspective and greater ownership of the development 
agenda. ACET’s staff and preeminent network of African professionals and international 








With this publication, the African Center for Economic Transformation is launching its 
Occasional Paper Series. The papers in this series will analyze and make 
recommendations on specific issues relating to the key drivers of economic 
transformation in Africa—such as education and skills, domestic resource mobilization, 
the business environment, foreign direct investment, export promotion, and infrastructure 
development. They will draw on analytical work completed or in progress by our staff, 
our senior associates (nonresident fellows), or our network of collaborating think tanks in 
Africa. We will also invite eminent specialists or economists to contribute a piece 
responding to important developments in the international arena, with a major bearing on 
Africa’s economic transformation.   
 
This paper, Innovative Financing for Infrastructure in Low Income Countries: How might 
the G20 Help?, by Akbar Noman, Senior Fellow, Initiative for Policy Dialogue at 
Columbia University fits the last category. Prof. Noman also teaches at Columbia’s 
School of International and Public Affairs and is a co-director of the Task Force on 
Africa convened by Nobel economics laureate Professor Joseph Stiglitz to focus on the 
special challenges facing economic development in Africa. In his paper Prof. Noman 
responds to the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit declaration on the importance of accelerated 
growth in low-income countries and on setting up an Independent High Level Panel for 
Infrastructure Investment to identify and recommend concrete measures and initiatives to 
attract affordable finance for the infrastructure needs of such countries, the majority of 
them in Africa.  
 
I hope the recommendations in this paper—including one for a mechanism to direct part 
of the large and growing savings surpluses of some countries, particularly those of 
sovereign wealth funds, to low-income countries on appropriate concessional terms—will 
be useful to the High-Level Panel in producing its final report to the G20 leaders in 
November 2011. Those recommendations should also be useful to the multilateral 
development banks, particularly the African Development Bank and the World Bank, 
requested by the G20 leaders to review their policies and recommend measures to scale 
up financing and diversify the sources of “ affordable” finance for infrastructure. More 
broadly, the approach recommended by Prof. Noman need not be confined to 
infrastructure: activities related to climate change also have many externalities, and thus 
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Among the outcomes of the Group of 20 (G20) Seoul Summit in November 2010 was an 
enhanced focus on development, especially infrastructure in low-income countries 
(LICs). The comprehensive work program that emerged included the establishment of a 
High-Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment to report to the forthcoming summit in 
France.  
 
The tasks of the panel include reviewing policies of multilateral development banks and 
recommending measures to do the following: scale up financing and diversify sources of 
affordable finance for infrastructure; proposing innovative ways to mitigate and 
intermediate risks to attract finance; and reviewing the action plans of multilateral 
development banks as set out at the Seoul Summit. 
 
Many of the actions for infrastructure development will take time to bear fruit. The aims 
of this think-piece are to propose some ways of responding to the G20’s initiative. One 
such  response could comprise  mobilizing innovative financing that uses the large and 
growing savings surpluses of some countries, often held in sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs); providing those resources to LICs on appropriately concessional terms; using 
those resources to encourage private investments; and beginning to use the monies 
quickly while measures to scale up their use are taken.  
 
This document is more of a think-piece than a blueprint, and as such does not address all 
details of design and implementation. It does, however, pay particular attention to the 
region of Sub-Saharan Africa, where most LICs are and where LICs generally have 
worse infrastructure than LICs elsewhere. Overcoming infrastructure shortfalls is 
expected to have a large impact on the region’s economic growth, with significant 
implications for employment and poverty.  
 
A substantial infrastructure financing gap for Sub-Saharan Africa still remains, even 
though China has emerged as an important source and other donors have stepped up their 
assistance in recent years. The shortfall is estimated to be nearly $10 billion a year for the 
region’s LICs or roughly 15% of their gross domestic product. It is highly unlikely that 
efficiency gains and conventional financing can close the gap, and new sources of 
$5 billion–$6 billion a year are likely to be required to meet the shortfall. Part will come 
from the private sector, but given externalities and public goods considerations, a large 
role for the public sector is inevitable.  
 
                                                  
 Valuable comments were gratefully received from K.Y. Amoako, Yaw Ansu, Ali Mansoor, Ato Newai Gebre-ab, and 
Shriti Vadera on the version of this paper presented at an ACET workshop in April 2011 on the theme “promoting 
economic transformation in Africa”, in Bellagio, Italy.. Thanks are due to the workshop participants, especially Kwesi 
Botchwey, Hela Cheikhrouhou, and Michel Wormser who provided particularly useful comments. Needless to say, 
they are all absolved from any responsibility for the views and inadequacies of the paper.  
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While the prospects for conventional aid from Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries are clouded by their budget constraints, the growing 
savings surpluses in some countries (mainly in East Asia and the Middle East) are likely 
to maintain the recent huge growth of SWFs. At the end of 2010 total SWF assets were 
around $4,300 billion, and are projected to rise to some $10,000 billion by 2015. 
 
These trends raise the question of whether and how official development assistance might 
be leveraged to mobilize SWF resources. The answer revolves around the basic ideas of 
providing insurance against risks and for financing a wedge between the terms on which 
the monies are raised from SWFs and the terms on which they are provided to LICs for 
sovereign borrowing. Our simulation suggests that official development assistance could 
be greatly leveraged if it is used for such subsidies. Donors would provide a guarantee for 
borrowings from SWFs and use aid monies to subsidize the interest payments for 
sovereign borrowing.  
 
In this scenario, a Low Income Country Infrastructure Fund (LICIF) would be established 
to intermediate the transactions. It could be administered by multilateral development 
banks (as with some other funds). It would also lend to the private sector, particularly 
public–private partnerships, without an interest subsidy. The provision of term finance at 
reasonable interest rates should provide a big boost for private involvement in 
infrastructure, given the paucity of such financing in LICs. (Details are in section IV, the 
heart of this exercise.) 
 
The budget cost of the guarantees and the leverage they will provide depend on the terms 
on which these contingent liabilities are accounted for. Accounting rules vary but 
typically only those guarantees “likely to be called” are put on the balance sheet, and 
these are unlikely to be in that category. Some countries could set up a reserve fund 
amounting to, say, 10%–20% of the guarantee. The simulation suggests that the costs 
could be accommodated easily even by existing aid budgets, even if we assume that all 
the financing is subsidized. It also suggests annual costs in the range of $1 billion–
$2 billion for financing some $5 billion a year, which exaggerates subsidized-borrowing 
needs. Private participation is highly likely to greatly reduce these needs, such that on 
reasonable assumptions leverage could be as high as 15:1. Even the top end of the range 
of annual costs amounts to less than 2% of total official aid from OECD countries in 
2009.  
 
Most LICs can only scale up infrastructure gradually, but some could embark on major 
projects fairly quickly. These countries’ economic management is of a high enough 
standard to let them leap ahead. There may also be some regional projects that could start 
in the near term.  
 
The approach outlined here need not, of course be confined to infrastructure. Activities 
related to climate change in particular represent other big-ticket items that also have 




For implementing the approach proposed here (or some variant), a task force or a high-
level panel should be established by, say, November 2011. It would then follow up on the 
many details of design and implementation by about April–May 2012, aiming to make 





The Group of 20 (G20) summit meeting in Seoul in November 2010 broadened the focus 
of the G20 on development issues, especially for low-income countries (LICs). The 
summit’s leaders’ declaration speaks of the need to “ensure accelerated growth in low 
income countries.” The summit yielded the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared 
Growth reflected in a multiyear action plan, which summarized the concrete measures 
proposed for accelerating growth in developing countries, notably LICs, “including, in 
particular, through the development of infrastructure.”  
 
The action plan delineates nine pillars of G20 support for LICs. It seems to place 
particular emphasis on the infrastructure pillar, which has a heavy bearing on some other 
pillars including trade facilitation; private investment and jobs creation; and food 
security.1 
 
Many of the actions for infrastructure development will take time to bear fruit as they 
encompass a comprehensive array of measures (see below). The aims of this think-piece 
are to propose ways for:  
 
 Mobilizing innovative financing that serves to use some countries’ large and growing 
savings surpluses, often held in sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 
 Providing those resources to LICs on appropriately concessional terms. 
 Using those resources to encourage private investments. 
 Beginning to use the monies quickly while measures to scale up their use are taken. 
 
The ideas and proposals advanced below are sketched in broad, conceptual terms. The 
details of design and implementation are for the most part outside the scope of this 
exercise—given that it is more in the nature of a think-piece to throw up ideas rather than 
to offer blueprints. The main proposals and recommendations are in section IV.  
 
The G20 asked multilateral development banks (MDBs) to carry out tasks in the 
following five infrastructure areas: 
 
 Information and needs assessment. This includes estimating funding requirements and 
delivering bankable growth-supporting regional connectivity projects. 
 Internal practices.These relate to improving internal procedures and guidelines and 
assessing adequacy of internal resources for infrastructure development. 
 Improving the domestic infrastructure investment climate in LICs.This entails easing 
institutional, regulatory policy, and public sector capacity constraints to remove 
bottlenecks, including adopting whole-life costing and planning for new 
infrastructure, enhancing operations and maintenance, and rehabilitating existing 
infrastructure; improving internal resource mobilization and increasing fiscal space; 
and increasing energy access, including a focus on sustainability, cost-effective of 
renewable energy, conservation, and increased efficiency. 
                                                  
1 The other five pillars are human resource development, growth with resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource 
mobilization,and knowledge sharing. 
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 Special measures for regional integration. 
 Transparency and sustainability. 
 
This represents an ambitious, comprehensive approach to overcoming the infrastructure 
shortfalls in LICs, and many of these tasks will take several years to yield results. But we 
do not have to wait long to start making a deep dent in LICs’ infrastructure shortfalls. 
Suggestions for quick actions that can be embarked on in the near term are given below. 
 
The Seoul Summit resulted in the establishment of a G20 High-Level Panel for 
Infrastructure Investment. The panel is to report to finance ministers and to the summit 
leaders in France.2 It is tasked with, among other things, reviewing MDB policies and 
recommending measures to scale up financing and diversify sources of affordable 
finance; taking account of the risk-bearing capacity of private and semi-public finance, of 
lessons of successes and failures, of durability, of whole-life costing, and of innovative 
ways to mitigate and intermediate risks to attract finance; and reviewing the MDB action 
plans for the above tasks. 
 
The focus of this paper is on infrastructure, but mobilizing SWF resources for LICs along 
the lines proposed below need not be confined to that sector. Notably, financing for 
mitigation and adaptation associated with climate change is another big ticket item, and 
one that has a significant infrastructure dimension that would be amenable to the 
approach proposed here.  
 
The rest of this document is organized as follows. Section II sketches infrastructure and 
financing shortfalls in Sub-Saharan Africa.Section III looks at sources of innovative 
finance. Section IV—the heart of the exercise—outlines proposals for mobilizing 
sovereign surpluses to provide affordable financeto LICs. Section V raises issues of 
implementation and follow-up actions.  
 
 
II. INFRASTRUCTURE SHORTFALLS 
 
Defining and estimating infrastructure shortfalls have, of course, different approaches and 
hence produce a range of figures. But their broad magnitude can be seen. The focus of 
many exercises in this area has been on Africa, the region with the largest infrastructure 
deficit, as well as the most LICs.  
 
Infrastructure shortfalls in African LICs generally greatly exceed those of LICs in other 
regions, and this paper pays those in Africa the most attention. The proposals outlined 
below are, however, equally relevant for LICs elsewhere.  
 
                                                  
2 A preliminary report is to be submitted by June 2011 and the final one by November 2011. 
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Table 1. Utility outages 
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa is far less developed on average than in other low-
income countries around the world. 
 Low-income countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa Rest of world 
Road densitya 137 211 
Paved road densitya 31 134 
Power generation capacityb 37 326 
Electricity access 16 41 
Access to reliable waterc,d 60 72 
Access to sanitationc,d 34 51 
a. Kilometers per square kilometer. 
b. Megawatts per population in millions. 
c. Percentage of population. 
d. At or above a standard threshold of quality. 
Source: IMF Survey at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/CAR072110B.htm. 
 
A recent report of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic nicely summarized the 
upshot of the work on infrastructural deficits in Africa: “Africa's infrastructure is by far 
the most deficient and costly in the developing world. Inadequate infrastructure is 
holding back economic growth by two percentage points each year. Solving the problem 
will cost US$80 billion per year, about twice what is currently being spent. More money 
is desperately needed, particularly for the power sector. But money alone is not the 
answer. Prudent policies, wise management, and sound maintenance can make current 
resources go much farther, and contribute significantly to narrowing the infrastructure 
gap.”3 
 
The figure given of $80 billion a year is for all Sub-Saharan Africa ($93 billion for all 
Africa). For Africa’s LICs, the financing requirement has been estimated at around 
$20 billion–$25 billion (and perhaps $5 billion–$10 billion for LICs elsewhere). This 
figure translates to about 15% of GDP a year for the next decade or so in African LICs.4 
Something in the order of $45 billion is spent annually in Africa, implying a shortfall of 
roughly $35 billion in Africa. For the LICs in Africa therefore the shortfall is likely to be 
around $9 billion–$10 billion a year; part of this can be filled by efficiency gains, 
including improved revenue collection.5 Non-African LICs may account for another 
$1 billion–$2 billion, for a total of some $10 billion–$11 billion a year. 
 
Despite recent attention from traditional, mainly Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, donors after some quarter century of neglect, prospects of increases in 
                                                  
3Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, “Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transition”, at 
www.infrastructureafrica.org. 
4The African Development Bank estimates that about another $70 billion is the annual “need” in the middle-income 
countries of Africa (including North Africa).  
5 These efficiency gains for Africa as a whole are theoretically estimated at some $17 billion.They also include 




official development assistance (ODA) from them do not suggest that ODA would be 
adequate to meet the shortfall in African LICs, given the general worsening of rich-
country fiscal positions. China has emerged as by far the most important source of 
additional infrastructure financing in Africa, but that still leaves a large gap, especially in 
the region’s LICs.  
 
The recent attention includes a variety of initiatives. They have been launched, often in 
partnership, by the African Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and the umbrella 
of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as 
well as several bilateral donors, notably the Department for International Development of 
the United Kingdom. They focus not just on additional financing from conventional 
sources, but also on planning and implementing infrastructure projects and policies, 
especially multicountry regional projects.  
 
Before turning to how to plug the financing gap, we emphasize an important indirect 
impact of such deficits not captured by cost-benefit analysis of individual projects, which 
magnifies the importance of addressing these deficits. This is the impact of infrastructure 
deficiencies on aggregate economic growth, and hence on employment and poverty.  
 
Estimating new infrastructure’s impact on economic growth is a complicated exercise 
that yields a range of estimates in different countries. But the broad thrust of various 
studies presented in capsule form (box 1) leaves little doubt that improved infrastructure 
can have a large impact on accelerating growth and reducing povertyin Africa. The above 
estimate for Africa of 2 percentage points a year slower growth due to infrastructural 
deficiencies6 is broadly in line with another that suggests that annual growth would 
increase by 2.6 percentage points if infrastructure was to approximate the level of the 
Republic of Korea and by 2.2 percentage points to that in Mauritius, the highestranked 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa for infrastructure availability.  
 
Box 1. What the research says 
 
The study, its method’sscope and sector, and its conclusions are presented in that order in what 
follows on the links between infrastructure and growth 
 
Easterly and Levine 1997 Multicountry Africa, Telecommunications, 
Power—Infrastructure is strongly and significantly correlated with growth. 
 
Esfahani and Ramirez 2003 Multicountry Africa, Telecommunications, Power—Africa’s growth 
per capita would be 0.9 points higher with East Asia’s infrastructure. 
 
Calderón and Servén 2008 Multicountry Africa, Telecommunications, power, roads— 
Africa’s growth per capita would be 1.0 point higher with the Republic of Korea’s infrastructure. 
 
Estache, Speciale, and Veredas 2005 Multicountry Africa,various—Confirms earlier work and 
underscores equal relevance for coastal and landlocked countries. 
                                                  





Calderón 2008 Multicountry Africa, Telecommunications, power, roads—Africa’s growth per 
capita would be 2.3 points higher with Mauritius’s infrastructure. 
 
Calderón and Servén 2008 Multicountry Africa, Telecommunications, power, roads— 
Extends earlier results to show infrastructure also has a negative effect on inequality. 
 
Fedderke and Bogetic 2006 Country study, South Africa,various—Finds long-term relationship 
between infrastructure and growth based on robust econometric techniques. 
 
Ayogu 1999 Production function, Nigeria,various—Finds strong association between 
infrastructure and output in panel data. 
 
Kamara 2008 Production function, Africa,various—Finds strong association between 
infrastructure and output in panel data. 
 
Reinikka and Svensson 1999a Enterprise surveys, Uganda, Power—Unreliable power is a 
significant deterrent to private sector investment. 
 
Escribano, Guasch, and Pena 2008 Enterprise surveys, Africa,various—Infrastructure has a 
substantial effect on total factor productivity. 
 
Source: African Development Bank. 
 
 
III. SOURCES OF INNOVATIVE FINANCE 
 
Proposals abound for mobilizing innovative finance for development, particularly for 
mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change. These include taxes on foreign 
exchange transactions (the Tobin tax), on financial transactions, and on carbon emissions.  
 
Other innovations are reflected in such initiatives as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunisation; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; and the 
International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm). These initiatives mobilize 
resources from a combination of public, nongovernmental organization, and private 
sources and include such innovations as (Product) RED under which some of the world’s 
corporations create products with the logo (Product) RED and channel a portion of their 
profits from the sales of these products to health programs in Africa. UNITAID provides 
funding for treatment of HIV/AIDS by raising funds (around $1 billion since inception in 
2006) mainly from a tax on airline tickets.  
 
IFFIm is financed by bonds issued in the capital markets whose servicing is guaranteed 
by donor countries that make legally binding aid commitments. It was launched in 2006 
at the initiative of the United Kingdom with support from France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, South Africa, and Spain. It aims to raise $4 billion over 10 years. The World 




The World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), oriented to the private 
sector, has very recently established the IFC Asset Management Company to catalyze 
private finance for infrastructure projects as fund manager of third-party capital.  
 
Another initiative, the Policy Support Instrument of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), is mobilizing nontraditional financing sources for infrastructure in Africa in four 
countries: Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Policy programs allow for 
financing on nonconcessional terms from MDBs and export credit agencies; greater use 
of public–private partnerships (PPPs); and, potentially, sovereign bond issues. While the 
initiative of the IMF to reduce infrastructural deficits in LICs is welcome, the scale of 
such efforts is highly constrained in African LICs by the limited space for increasing 
external debt on even these terms before debt sustainability becomes an issue.  
 
An interesting recent proposal was that of IMF staff for issuing special drawing rights 
(SDRs) to developing countries to help finance some of the costs of mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change. The informal negative reaction of the IMF’s executive 
board prevented the proposal from being formally considered by the board, however. 
Still, some variant of the proposal deserves to be revived and the G20 can play a role in 
this. Such a mechanism need not be confined to climate change but could also include 
infrastructure, especially given the contribution that infrastructure investments, above all 
in energy, can make to environmental sustainability. The mechanism could well be more 
attractive if this paper’s ideas (or some version) on leveraging resources from savings-
rich countriesare implemented.  
 
Of late there has been growing interest in mobilizing the savings of big-surplus countries 
in East Asia and the Middle East for LICs’ infrastructure deficits. These surplus savings 
are manifested mainly in central banks’ international reserves and SWFs. For long-term 
financing—not very liquid and entailing risk—the SWFs are more relevant. They have 
grown hugely, with total assets of all SWFs estimated at $4,256 billion at the end of 2010 
(excluding three SWFs for which data were not available).7 
 
Annex I lists the SWFs and the size of their assets in U.S. dollar terms. There are 50 
SWFs in 39 countries, including one devoted to investments in Africa: the $5 billion 
China–Africa Development Fund established in 2007. The top 10, accounting for nearly 
three-quarters of SWF assets, are in seven economies: China (three), Singapore (two), 
UAE (Abu Dhabi), Norway, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong (China), and Kuwait.8 By one 
estimate, the assets of SWFs are expected to grow from $4.3 trillion in 2009/10 to $10 
trillion by 2015.9 The annual financing requirements for LICs amount to about 0.25% of 
the assets of the SWFs now and about 0.1% of the figure projected for 2015, which is 
around the time that infrastructure investment can be scaled up to anywhere near the level 
required.  
 
                                                  
7Namely, the SWFs of Oman and two smaller of the six SWFs in UAE, the Emirates Investment Authority and Abu 
Dhabi Investment Council.  
8Data from www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings. 
9 Gijon, Jose. “SWF and Infrastructure Investment in Africa: Challenges and Perspectives”, presentation at the 
NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative meeting in Entebbe, December 2008 (OECD). 
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The rest of this paper is devoted to providing input to the High-Level Panel, notably for 
its three tasks highlighted in the introduction. As said, the broad approach outlined below 
is also applicable for other sectors than infrastructure, and not just in LICs.  
 
 
IV. SOVEREIGN SURPLUSES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICITS 
 
The contrasting prospects of SWFs and ODA and the enormous needs for infrastructure 
financing in LICs give rise to the following questions: Whether, and how, might ODA 
resources be leveraged to mobilize SWF resources? The answer revolves around the basic 
idea of G20 (or G8) countries providing insurance against risks and financing a wedge 
between the terms on which monies are raised from the SWFs and the terms on which 
they are provided to LICs as sovereign debt. The allocation of ODA to such subsidies 
could leverage ODA resources substantially. We focus first on the resources to be raised 
for the public sector or sovereign debt before turning to what might be done to enhance 
private participation (which does not require a subsidy).  
 
Risk mitigation and subsidization raise four sets of issues (summarized in figure 1): 
reducing the risks of providers of finance such as SWFs; mitigating risks of borrowers 
such as LIC governments; financing a subsidy to the cost of finance, that is, paying the 
spread between the cost of borrowing (interest payments to SWFs) and the return on 
lending (interest payments by LICs); and apportioning the role of the private sector in 
sharing risks and costs. The third of these—subsidizing interest payments—is probably 
the most challenging. These four sets of issues are now discussed in greater detail. 
 
1. Attracting SWF Financing: Guarantees 
 
One obvious way of mobilizing SWF resources is to make it attractive for SWFs to lend 
money at reasonable interest rates through provision of guarantees. A potentially very 
important form this could take would be to issue long-term (20–30year) bonds to be 
bought by SWFs, structured in such a way as to satisfy “typical” SWF prudential/risk-
management considerations. The bonds would be guaranteed by some or all the G20 
members. To avoid carrying costs, the bonds would be issued on a commitment basis to 
be disbursed when projects materialize.10 
 
This in turn raises two questions: How will the balance sheets of countries issuing such 
guarantees treat the contingent liabilities arising (and with what implications)? And, what 
precisely will be the coverage of the guarantees? 
 
 
                                                  
10 This very useful suggestion comes from Michel Wormser, who served as a discussant for a version of this paper 
presented at a conference organized by ACET at the Rockefeller Foundation Center,Bellagio.  
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Figure 1.Low Income Countries Infrastructure Fund 
 
 
Note: The Low Income Country Infrastructure Fund could include a project preparation 
facility ($300 million–$500 million). 
 
Guarantees in this context only make sense if they can be leveraged, that is, if the 
contingent liabilities to which they give rise are counted as less than the liabilities that are 
not contingent, such as loans. Although there is no uniform way in which guarantees are 
accounted for in countries’ fiscal or national accounts, they invariably offer ample scope 
for leveraging (except the current practice of MDBs).11 The most common method only 
records those guarantees on the balance sheet that are “likely to be called” (probability 
greater than 50%). For the other guarantees—“unlikely to be called”—nothing is 
recorded on the balance sheet when the guarantee is given and payments are only 
recorded when they are called.  
 
The type of guarantees proposed here should fall in the “unlikely to be called” category 
(given, for example, that the World Bank estimates a default rate for International 
Development Association, IDA, countries of less than 5%).12 Another method is to record 
the risk-adjusted net present value of a guarantee as a liability. Some governments have 
set up a guarantee redemption (or reserve) fund to which automatic payments are made 
periodically for discharging the obligations that arise. Precisely how much leverage 
                                                  
11 ADB has just introduced a new partial risk guarantee facility for LICs eligible for its concessional window, African 
Development Fund, with only 25% of the value counting as a liability for 4:1 leverage. 
12 Salazar, Vander Caceres. “Taken for Granted? US Proposals to Reform the World Bank’s IDA Examined.” 2002, 
Breton Woods Project, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/reform/takenforgranted.pdf. 
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guarantees will provide in mobilizing resources from SWFs will depend on how they are 
accounted for, but there seems to be considerable scope for such leveraging.  
 
MDBs provide guarantees against some risks but are constrained by very conservative 
accounting for guarantees. The World Bank treats guarantees exactly as loans so that 
there is no leverage to be had from issuing guarantees.13 ADB’s capital adequacy and 
exposure framework treats guarantees as follows:  
 
As a contingent liability, a guarantee creates credit exposures similar to direct lending. The provisions 
of Article 15(1) and (3) of the Bank Agreement on maximum Bank exposure will therefore apply in 
respect of guarantees. For the purpose of measuring credit exposure, the loan equivalent of the 
guarantee would be computed. The loan equivalent is the present value, from the first callable date, of 
the outstanding guarantee amount, as increased or decreased by disbursements and repayments. The 
discount rate for calculating the present value shall be the applicable borrowing cost for the relevant 
maturity, in the currency in which the guarantee is denominated, as determined by the Bank on the 
date the present value is calculated.14 
 
This overly conservative treatment of guarantees by MDBs presumably stems from 
concern over their credit rating. But there would seem to be some scope for increased 
leverage without compromising that. Indeed, ADB has just introduced a new partial risk 
guarantee facility for LICs eligible for its concessional window, African Development 
Fund (ADF), with only 25% of the value counting as a liability, or a leverage of 4:1. The 
scope for such leveraging for other types of guarantees by ADB and other MDBs, notably 
the World Bank, should be explored (including discussions with rating agencies) as part 
of the reforms to their procedures that the G20 has called for.  
 
For G20 countries an alternative to relying on countries’ accounting rules would be to set 
up a guarantee fund equivalent to, say, 10%–20% of the guaranteed amount. This fund 
would then serve as an insurance pool for paying out individual guarantees in full on the 
(undoubtedly safe) assumption that no more than 10%–20% of total guarantees will be 
called (given the sub-5% default rate for IDA countries).  
 
The details of how the guarantee fund would work need to be clarified. It could be 
administered by MDBs in some combination with the World Bank and ADB being 
prominent, given the preponderance of LICs in Africa. Default risks could also be 
reduced by the selection criteria for recipient countries, which would rule out grossly 
mismanaged economies such as Eritrea or Zimbabwe. These criteria would be broad and 
minimal to avoid their transformation into policy conditionality.  
 
The monies raised from the SWFs for onlending would constitute a Low Income Country 
Infrastructure Fund (LICIF) (see figure 1). This fund could be managed along the lines of 
IFFIm with some combination of MDBs performing the World Bank role of being the 
treasury and financial adviser to IFFIm.  
 
                                                  
13 Recently the World Bank moved to ease constraints for purposes of exposure to individual countries with a guarantee 
counting less than a loan, though the aggregate amount of guarantees count against its capital base just as loans do.  
14ADB. “Bank Policy on Guarantees,” available at www.afdb.org. 
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For multicountry regional projects, special-purpose vehicles could be created. They 
would borrow on terms similar to those for individual LICs. Such vehicles would face 
only one set of regulations and procedures, rather than having one for each country, 
which would enable better coordination and planning of projects, facilitate faster 
implementation, and provide comfort to financiers that they only have to deal with one 
entity on the project. 
What should the guarantees cover? One option is to emulate the guarantee schemes 
offered by MDBs, which are broadly similar (Annexes II and III). They roughly 
correspond to Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s (MIGA) insurance of eligible 
projects against losses relating to five areas: currency transfer restrictions; expropriation; 
war and civil disturbance; breach of contract; and nonhonoring of sovereign financial 
obligations. If (and how) the guarantees for mobilizing SWF resources should differ need 
to be explored.  
2. Mitigating Borrower Risks 
 
MDBs offer several products to mitigate the borrowing country’s risks. LICs borrowing 
from LICIF should be made eligible for these. Again, the risk-management products of 
various MDBs are broadly similar. They all largely reflect the range of such products 
introduced by ADB in 2002 to allow borrowers to better manage the financial risks 
associated with their ADB loans, to access market-based hedging tools using ADB as an 
intermediary, and to actively manage their ADB debt portfolio. These products include 
interest-rate and currency swaps, caps, collars, commodity hedges, and indexed loans.  
 
Whether and how the financial products offered by the MDBs should be modified or 
supplemented, especially for foreign exchange risks, should be examined by the MDBs 
themselves or by a special task force. 
 
3. Making Finance Affordable 
 
The ability of LICs to service debts on the terms at which SWFs would wish to lend is 
severely constrained. Thus LICs will need some form of subsidy to finance the spread 
between borrowing and lending interest rates—as noted above, probably the most 
challenging of the tasks for mobilizing finance. The basic idea of leveraging ODA 
resources to transform a very small portion of the SWF surpluses into concessional 
finance raises rather more complex issues than those raised by guarantees.  
 
Ideally, the terms on which the monies raised will be onlent will be similar to IDA or 
ADF terms. But there is a tradeoff between the extent of subsidy and the amount of 
resources that can be mobilized. A simulation to illustrate the magnitudes involved 
suggests that the budget costs of the subsidy will be quite modest relative to aid flows. 
Indeed, accommodating the costs even within existing aid budgets does not look difficult. 
The MDBs also ought to consider using their concessional window (such as IDA or 




What the subsidy amounts to will be a function of the stock of outstanding borrowings 
from SWFs and the difference between the borrowing and lending interest rates: 
s = (rb – rl) Σd 
 
where rb= interest rate paid to SWFs; rl= interest rate charged to LICs; and Σd = stock 
of debt. 
 
To the extent guarantees (g) entail budget costs, the additional cost will be: 
 
g = a Σd 
 
where a is assumed to range between 10% and 20% on average. 
 
Leverage (lv) is a function of stock of outstanding debt, the subsidy, and the costs of the 
guarantees:  
 
lv = Σd/(s+g)  
 
(If the contingent liabilities that guarantees entail are not accounted for, lv is simply the 
ratio of debt to interest subsidy, that is, lv = Σd/s.)  
 
For the purposes of simulation we make the following conservative and plausible 
assumptions: 
 
The weighted average interest rate on bonds issued by/for LICIF (rb) is 6%. The monies 
are lent to LICs (rl) at 1%. The debt stock, which equals disbursement (no repayments in 
the period), rises as follows:  
 
Year 1: $0.5 billion; year 2: $2.5 billion; year 3: $5 billion; years 4–10: $6 billion every 
year, so that by the end of 10 years (or 2021 if LICIF is launched in 2012) the total stock 
of LICIF debt (Σd) would be $50 billion. (For ease of computation it is further assumed 
that the stock of debt remains constant throughout a year, that is, all borrowings take 
place on January 1).  
 
This is an extremely conservative assumption about sovereign/subsidized financing 
needs, which are likely to be significantly lower on account of the private participation 
and equity investments by LICIF. Hence the following estimates considerably exaggerate 
the budget costs for the given spread between borrowing and lending rates. Put 
differently, the estimates allow a very comfortable cushion for other assumptions to have 
been too optimistic. 
 
If guarantees are costless in budget terms then: 
 
In 2021, the subsidy would amount to $2.5 billion. The accumulated subsidy for the 




If guarantees are accounted for at 10% then:g = $5 billion; s+g = $16.2 billion; and lv = 
3.1:1. If at 20% then: g = $10 billion; s+g = $22.2 billion; and lv = 2.3:1. 
 
In an alternative scenario with a smaller spread between the two interest rates so that (rb–
rl) = 3% then: s = $7.5 billion and if g = 0; lv = 6.6:1. 
 
If g is accounted for at 10% then: s+g = $12.5 billion and lv = 4:1. 
 
As said, these estimates substantially exaggerate the budget costs. They also understate 
the leverage by exaggerating needs for subsidized financing. They are tantamount to 
excluding, in effect, LICIF lending to the private sector without an interest subsidy as 
proposed below. (How LICIF might stimulate the private sector is discussed in the next 
subsection.) But if we assume that private investment with and without PPPs accounts for 
half the additional investments in infrastructure, the subsidy cost will be halved and the 
leverage doubled (if guarantees are costless to the budget).  
 
Even in the worst scenario above where the accumulated budget costs over 10 years are 
$22.2 billion, the average of $2.2 billion a year amounts to no more than 1.8% of the flow 
of net official aid in 2009 (excluding aid from developing countries, notably China). This 
net flow to LICs in 2009 was $39.8 billion, so that the average annual costs amount to a 
little more than 5% of the net aid received by LICs (again excluding aid from developing 
countries).  
 
The scenarios sketched above are plausible, except that they underestimate private 
investment. The assumed borrowing cost (rb) of 6% compares with current yields of 
around 3%–4% on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. Given the current uncertainty over 
interest rates, possible defaults, or higher cost of guarantees than assumed above, 
however, budget costs are cushioned by the exaggeration of subsidized finance and can 
be reduced further in the following ways. 
 
For some projects (in energy, for example) and for some countries, the interest subsidy 
could be less than that implied by onlending on IDA/ADF terms, say, an interest rate of 
2%–3%. The capacity of LICs to borrow on somewhat less favorable terms than those of 
IDA/ADF consistent with a prudent debt burden would vary from country to country. 
Eventually, it may be necessary to distinguish two groups of LICs: those that can and 
those that cannot borrow on somewhat harder terms. 
 
This also raises the question of what alternatives there might be to ODA resources for 
financing the interest subsidy as it rises over time. Various proposals have been made. 
These mechanisms deserve further consideration especially in light of the leverage they 
can provide to mobilize surplus savings from SWFs. Thus very modest amounts of 
innovative finance, perhaps in the form of taxes on carbon, on some financial 
transactions, or on air travel, could serve to mobilize large flows for investment in 
infrastructure, especially of the kind closely allied with mitigation and adaptation to 
climate change (energy investments above all). As suggested above, the IMF staff 
proposal for issuing SDRs to finance investments related to climate change is well worth 
13 
 
revisiting. Even if confined to environmental sustainability, this could mobilize large 
resources for infrastructure along the lines proposed here. Perhaps consideration could 
also be given to more generally using SDR issuance to subsidize the borrowings of LICs 
from SWFs.  
 
4. Apportioning the Role of the Private Sector 
 
The limitations on the public sector’s sustainable level of debt is one argument for 
encouraging private investment. But experience with PPPs has disappointed the very high 
hopes held when the fashion began. Annex IV provides an indication of past trends and 
future potential. Telecommunications are the most favored subsector, particularly in 
LICs. PPPs have been least used in Africa among regions and in LICs among the income 
groups.  
 
Still, the trend is encouraging with investment as PPPs rising since the mid-2000s in 
Africa (especially in countries other than South Africa and Nigeria, which had been 
dominant in earlier years) and in LICs. These trends augur well for the private sector to 
make a significant contribution and share the risks. LICIF can also serve to catalyze 
private investments.  
 
LICIF resources could be onlent to the private sector for participation in infrastructure 
projects at nonsubsidized interest rates. The availability of medium- to long-term finance 
at reasonable rates should be a powerful incentive in a region where such financing is 
especially scarce. The IFC, which has recently launched an initiative for stimulating 
private involvement in infrastructure, is an obvious candidate for helping design and 
carry out such a scheme.  
 
In addition to fixed-income securities, SWFs ought to be encouraged to take equity 
positions with or without a PPP. The enhanced scope for guarantees could provide partial 
insurance to cover some of the risks of private investment, including direct investment by 
SWFs. The financing for the public sector would of course, include that for the public 
part of a PPP. Identifying and recommending measures for improving the domestic 
infrastructure investment climate in LICs is one of the tasks that the G20 has asked 
MDBs to undertake. 
 
The private sector received a great deal of attention in a “brainstorming” session that 
ADB organized with a select group of prominent private sector experts in Paris in 
February 2011. The measures proposed included using “public finance to create risk 
mitigating financial products that give comfort to private sector investors: A combination 
of traditional finance, sourced mainly from bilateral agencies, multilateral development 
banks and private capital was seen as the most feasible way to raise sufficient capital for 
developing infrastructure in Africa.”15 This was very much in line with the approach 
proposed by this paper. So, too, was the proposal to “aggressively tap into Private Equity 
                                                  
15 ADB. “Mobilizing Alternative Sources for Infrastructure Financing for Africa Brainstorming Session, Paris, France, 
February 28, 2011: Summary Note for the Record” (mimeo).  
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markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds,” with DFIs considering “taking on a brokering role 




The tasks that the G20 has asked the MDBs and the High-Level Panel to undertake 
reflect the range of the measures needed for large scaling up of infrastructure investments 
in LICs. These preparatory steps themselves will take some time before their 
implementation starts. Scaling up at the magnitude envisaged by the Seoul Summit will 
be a medium-term process—probably 2–3 years to get going in a significant way in most 
LICs and regional projects.  
 
Yet some countries could embark on major infrastructure projects fairly quickly. These 
are countries where the overall economic management and policies and procedures of 
substantial segments of infrastructure sectors are of a high enough standard to permit 
them to leap ahead, and include Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Some regional 
projects could possibly begin quite soon. Hence the proposals here can begin to have an 
impact in the near future. NEPAD has (with ADB) prepared a priority list of regional 
projects that could form the basis of early feasibility studies.  
 
Financing should be provided for both new investment and rehabilitation. Whole-life 
financing ought also to be considered, and operations and maintenance expenditures 
would be funded on a sliding scale over time pari passu with sectoral and other reforms 
(including expanding fiscal space as the G20 has asked the MDBs to facilitate). For 
example, starting with 50% in the first year, funding for operations and maintenance 
would decline by perhaps 5 percentage points in each of the first six years and 
10 percentage points in the next two years.  
 
The reforms needed in sectoral and macroeconomic policies and institutions for 
sustainable and efficient use of infrastructure financing, as identified in the G20 Seoul 
meeting documents, envisage a vital role for MDBs. So do some of the proposals in this 
paper. For MDBs to perform these functions quickly and well, it is important that they 
are not unfunded mandates. The G20 countries should consider allocating resources for 
these tasks (perhaps $3 million–$5 million).  
 
Project preparation also requires funds. A heavy constraint to expanding infrastructure 
investments is lack of bankable projects. Project preparation for many types of 
infrastructure projects is an expensive proposition that can run into several million 
dollars. A project preparation fund of, say, $300 million–$500 million for MDBs also 
deserves consideration.  
 
If the approach proposed here (or some variant) is endorsed by the High-Level Panel, put 
on the Paris Summit agenda, and then approved by the leaders, a timetable of follow-up 
actions should be drawn up. The first task would be to establish a task force or a high-
                                                  
16 Ibid. The summary note does not go into much detail on how the various ideas thrown up in the brainstorming 
session might be designed and implemented.  
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level panel by November 2011 to follow up on the many details of design and 
implementation by about April–May 2012, aiming to make the approach operational by 






Annex I. Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings 
Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds by Assets under Management 














556.8 1990 Oil 10 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign 
Holdings 
439.1 n/a Oil 2 
China SAFE Investment 
Company 
347.1a 1997 Noncommodity 2 
China China Investment 
Corporation 








292.3 1993 Noncommodity 8 








202.8 1953 Oil 6 
China National Social 
Security Fund 
146.5 2000 Noncommodity 5 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 145.3 1974 Noncommodity 10 
Russia National Welfare 
Fund 
142.5b 2008 Oil 5 
Qatar Qatar Investment 
Authority 
85 2005 Oil 5 
Australia Australian Future 
Fund 
72.9 2004 Noncommodity 10 
Libya Libyan Investment 
Authority 
70 2006 Oil 2 
Algeria Revenue 
Regulation Fund 







48.2 1984 Oil n/a 
U.S.–Alaska Alaska Permanent 
Fund 
39.7 1976 Oil 10 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan 
National Fund 
38.6 2000 Oil 6 
Korea, Rep. Korea Investment 37 2005 Noncommodity 9 
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Malaysia KhazanahNasional 36.8 1993 Noncommodity 4 
Ireland National Pensions 
Reserve Fund 
33 2001 Noncommodity 10 
Brunei Brunei Investment 
Agency 
30 1983 Oil 1 
France Strategic 
Investment Fund 
28 2008 Noncommodity n/a 
Iran Oil Stabilisation 
Fund 
23 1999 Oil 1 
Chile Social and 
Economic 
Stabilization Fund 
21.8 1985 Copper 10 




19.6 2006 Oil 4 
Canada Alberta’s Heritage 
Fund 
14.4 1976 Oil 9 
U.S.–New 
Mexico 
New Mexico State 
Investment 
Council 






13.3 2002 Oil 10 
New Zealand New Zealand 
Superannuation 
Fund 
12.1 2003 Noncommodity 10 
Bahrain Mumtalakat 
Holding Company 
9.1 2006 Oil 8 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of 
Brazil 
8.6 2009 Noncommodity TBA 
Oman State General 
Reserve Fund 
8.2 1980 Oil andgas 1 
Botswana Pula Fund 6.9 1994 Diamonds 
andminerals 
6 
East Timor Timor-Leste 
Petroleum Fund 
6.3 2005 Oil andgas 6 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment 
Fund 




















1.2 2005 Oil 3 
Venezuela FEM 0.8 1998 Oil 1 
Vietnam State Capital 0.5 2006 Noncommodity 4 
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Nigeria Excess Crude 
Account 




0.4 1956 Phosphates 1 
Indonesia Government 
Investment Unit 
0.3 2006 Noncommodity TBA 
Mauritania National Fund for 
Hydrocarbon 
Reserves 




n/a 2007 Oil 2 
Oman Oman Investment 
Fund 






n/a 2007 Oil TBA 
 Total oil andgas 
related 
2,463.0    
 Total other 1,792.9    
 Total 4,255.9    
a. This number is a best-guess estimation. 
b. This includes the oil stabilization fund of Russia. 
Note:All figures quoted are from official sources, or, where the institutions concerned do not have issue statistics of 
their assets, from other publicly available sources. Some of these figures are best estimates as market values change day 
to day.Updated March 2011. 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/. 
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Annex II. Coverage of MIGA Guarantees 
 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) insures against loses stemming from 
the following. 
Currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction. Protects against losses arising from an 
investor’s inability to legally convert local currency (capital, interest, principal, profits, 
royalties, and other remittances) into foreign exchange and transfer local currency or 
foreign exchange outside the country due to government action or failure to act. Currency 
depreciation is not covered. In the event of a claim, MIGA pays compensation in the 
currency specified in the contract of guarantee. 
Expropriation. Protects against losses arising from government actions that may reduce 
or eliminate ownership of, control over, or rights to the insured investment. In addition to 
outright nationalization and confiscation, “creeping” expropriation—a series of acts that, 
over time, have an expropriatory effect—is also covered. Coverage is available on a 
limited basis for partial expropriation (for example, confiscation of funds or tangible 
assets). 
In case of total expropriation of equity investments, compensation to the insured party is 
based on the net book value of the insured investment. For expropriation of funds, MIGA 
pays the insured portion of the blocked funds. For loans and loan guaranties, MIGA can 
insure the outstanding principal and any accrued and unpaid interest. Compensation will 
be paid upon assignment of the investor’s interest in the expropriated investment (for 
example, equity shares or interest in a loan agreement) to MIGA. 
War, terrorism, and civil disturbance. Protects against loss from, damage to, or the 
destruction or disappearance of, tangible assets or total business interruption (the total 
inability to conduct operations essential to a project’s overall financial viability) caused 
by politically motivated acts of war or civil disturbance in the country, including 
revolution, insurrection, coup d’état, sabotage, and terrorism. The cover protects against 
losses directly attributable to the physical damage of assets and total business 
interruption. For total business interruption, compensation would be based on the net 
book value of the total insured equity investment or the insured portion of the principle 
and interest payment in default as a direct result of a covered war and civil disturbance 
event. For tangible asset losses, MIGA will pay the investor’s share of the lesser of the 
book value of the project assets, their replacement cost, and the cost of repair of the 
damaged assets. 
Temporary business interruption can also be included upon a request from the investor 
and would cover three sources of interruption: damage of assets, forced abandonment, 
and loss of use. For short-term business interruption, MIGA will pay unavoidable 
continuing expenses and extraordinary expenses to resume operations and lost business 
income or, in the case of loans, missed payments. This coverage encompasses not only 
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violence in the host country directed against a host country government, but also against 
foreign governments or foreign investments, including the investor’s government or 
nationality. 
Breach of contract.Protects against losses arising from the government’s breach or 
repudiation of a contract with the investor. Breach of contract coverage may be extended 
to the contractual obligations of state-owned enterprises in certain circumstances. In the 
event of an alleged breach or repudiation, the investor should invoke a dispute resolution 
mechanism (such as arbitration) set out in the underlying contract. If, after a specified 
period of time, the investor has been unable to obtain an award due to the government’s 
frustration of its efforts, or has obtained an award but the investor has not received 
payment under the award, MIGA will pay compensation. If certain conditions are met, 
MIGA may, at its discretion, make a provisional payment pending the outcome of the 
dispute. MIGA may also elect to pay compensation without an award if the investor does 
not have recourse to a dispute resolution forum or there is unreasonable government 
interference with the investor’s pursuit of legal rights against the host government. 
Nonhonoring of sovereign financial obligations. Protects against losses resulting from a 
government’s failure to make a payment when due under an unconditional financial 
payment obligation or guarantee given in favor of a project that otherwise meets all of 
MIGA’s normal requirements. It does not require the investor to obtain an arbitral award. 
This coverage is applicable in situations when a sovereign’s financial payment obligation 
is unconditional and not subject to defenses. 





Annex III. Comparison of Guarantees offered by MDBs 




• Partial credit 
guarantee  




• Partial credit 
guarantee  





• Partial credit 
guarantee  






guarantee (PBG)  
• Partial credit 
guarantee  
• Partial risk 
guarantee  
• Guarantee under 
the Asian Currency 
Crisis Support 
Facility (PBG)  
 





currencies and also 
local currencies  
Eligibility: 
Borrowers  
Eligible to ADB, 
private sector and 
enclave projects loans  
Eligible to IBRD 
and enclave projects 
loans.  
IDA guarantee for 










eligible for Bank 
lending would 












are eligible for the 




The most appropriate 
lending instruments 
for the project: bond 
issues, commercial 
Bank loans, ADB, 
private placements. 




instruments for the 
project: bond issues, 
commercialBank 
loans, private 
placements, equity  
Loans to 
mobilize finance 
for projects  
Bank guarantees 
covers a wide variety 
of debt instruments, 
including loans from 
private,AsDB, 
financial institutions, 
and bond issues 
Link to Bank 
loan 
Not necessary  Not necessary Not necessary The Bank provides 
guarantee to projects 
where it has a stake 
in the project in the 
form of a direct loan 
(including 
subscription to a 




Features  ADB  World Bank  IaDB AsDB 
Guarantee 
charges 
Standby fee: 75bp 
applicable to the 
undisbursed portion of 
the guarantee in the 
same condition as with 
loans commitment fee. 
A waiver of a portion 
of the standby fee is 
applicable on the same 
basis as for Bank loans 
commitment fee. 
Private sector and 
enclave projects will 
follow the pricing of 
similar loans.  
Guarantee fee: 50bp 
plus a risk premium 
per year on the 
guarantee exposure, as 
of the first callable 
date, determined on a 
present value basis. 
The guarantee fee is 
payable either 
according to a 
schedule approved by 
the Bank or as one up-
front payment, in the 
currency of the 
guarantee. Private 
sector and enclave 
projects will follow 
the pricing of similar 
loans.  
Front-end fee: A 
front-end fee, as 
charged on Bank 
loans, would apply to 
the Bank maximum 
exposure.  
Other fees = legal and 
other expenses 
incurred by the Bank 
during the initiation, 
appraisal, 
underwriting and 
claim against the 
guarantee, other than 
the Bank’s traditional 
operation expenses, 
would be charged to 
the borrower/lender 
and are due upon 
request by the Bank  
Standby fee: 75bp 
applicable to the 
undisbursed portion 
of the guarantee in 
the same condition 
as with loans 
commitment fee. A 
waiver of a portion 
of the standby fee is 
applicable on the 
same basis as for 
Bank loans 
commitment fee.  
Guarantee fee: 75 
to 100bp (for PRG) 
and 75bp (for PCG) 
on the guarantee 
exposure, as of the 
first callable date, 
determined on a 
present value basis. 
The Bank retains a 
guarantee fee equal 
to 50bp. The rest is 




IBRD charges up to 
300 bp and retained 
from 50 to 100 bp. 
Private sector (IFC) 
projects will be 
priced as similar 
loans.  
Front-end fee: 
100bp on the Bank 
maximum exposure. 
The fee is payable 
upon effectiveness 
of the guarantee 
Facility fee: 
lending spread 
applicable for the 
current interest 
period and 
applied to the 
nominal value of 
the guarantee.  
Guarantee fee: a 
risk premium 
reflecting the 
coverage of the 
risk involved in 
each transaction, 
applicable to the 
outstanding 
callable amount 
covered by the 
guarantee. This 
fee ranges from 
15 to 75bp. This 
guarantee fee is 





Other fees: For 
partial risk 
guarantee, the 
Bank charges an 
appraisal fee 
Standby fee: For 
partial risk 
guarantee, the Bank 
charges 20 bp. 
Guarantee fee: the 
lending spread on 
loan (currently 40bp) 





guarantee fee is 
market determined, 
however, if there 
were a government 
counter guarantee 
these fee would be 
divided between the 
Bank and the 
government where 
the Bank retains 
40bp. This fee is 
applied to the 
present values of the 
future guarantee 
obligations from 
their callable dates.  
Front-end fee: For 
partial credit 
guarantee, the Bank 
charges 10–90 bp 
and for partial risk 
guarantees 100 bp 
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Features  ADB  World Bank  IaDB AsDB 
Payment of fees  Depending on the 
structure of the 
guarantee, up front or 
in installments for the 
standby fee and the 
guarantee fee. At 
request by the Bank 
for other fees 
Depending on the 
structure of the 
guarantee, up front 
or in installments for 
the standby fee and 
the guarantee fee. 
The front-end fee is 
paid upon 
effectiveness 
The fees are paid 
periodically 




servicing schedule of 
the Bank loan 
involved or in one 
payment up front 
Acceleration  At the discretion of the 
Bank 
At the discretion of 
the Bank  
At the discretion 
of the Bank 





Required for public 
sector projects and 
partial risk guarantees  









provide a strong 
signal of the 
government’s 
commitment to 
comply with the 




overall risk of the 
guarantee being 
called 
Guarantee to public 
sector entities would 
necessitate a counter 
guarantee from the 
host country 
government and 
guarantee to private 
sector would not 
need a counter 
guarantee. For a 
partial risk guarantee 
a counter guarantee 
would be generally 




If the guarantee is 
called, the Bank pays 
and activates the 




owes the Bank the 
money paid out 
according to the 
guarantee agreement. 
The terms of the 
amount owed is 
stipulated in the 
guarantee agreement 
If the guarantee is 
called, the IBRD 





the Bank the money 
paid out according 
to the guarantee 
agreement. The 
terms of the amount 
owed is stipulated in 
the guarantee 
agreement 
If the guarantee 
were called the 
funds would be 
disbursed 
promptly, 
becoming at that 
point a loan to be 
repaid by the 
counter guarantor 
or the borrower 
within a period to 
be defined by the 
Bank but no 
longer than the 
remaining life of 
the guarantee, 
following the 
first call on the 
guarantee 
If the guarantee is 
called, the Bank 






Features  ADB  World Bank  IaDB AsDB 
Procurement 
issues  
The proceeds must be 
used according to the 
Bank procurement 
guidelines  
The proceeds must 


















applicable to the 
parallel loan would 
apply to the 
guaranteed loans  
Implementation 
and supervision  
Same criteria and 
standards as for direct 
loans 
Same criteria and 
standards as 
investment loans 
The Bank would 
use the same 
supervision 
requirement as 
for a direct loan, 
however in the 





Bank could rely 
on supervision by 
its partners if 
their procedures 
are acceptable to 
the Bank 
Same supervision 
requirements as for 
the parallel loan 
would be applied to 
the guaranteed loan  




between the Bank and 
the lender or the 
borrower, the counter 
guarantee agreement 
between the Bank and 
the government of the 
RMC if it is a public 
sector guarantee or a 
PRG, the indemnity 
agreement between the 
Bank and the 
counter/guarantor or 









agreement and the 
project agreement  
The project 













documents as for the 
parallel loan, in 
IaDBaddition to the 
legal documentation 









guidelines will be used 
for the EA study  
The Bank’s 
environmental 
guidelines will be 














applicable to the 
parallel loan  
Management 
review and 
board approval  
Guarantees are 
reviewed like direct 








approval of a 
guarantee are 
identical to those 
used for loans  
Same procedures 
and requirements for 
appraisal and 
approval of the 
parallel loan would 





(2000) US$ 330 
million  
MTN–Cameroon 














guarantee of US$ 















AsDB = Asian Development Bank. 
Source: African Development Bank, “Bank Policy on Guarantees”. 
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Annex IV. Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure 
 
Investment commitments to infrastructure projects with private participation in developing countries, by sector or region, 1999–
2009  
2009 US$ billions  
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  
Sector  
Energy  26.2  31.4  20.1  16.4  24.1  15.7  20.4  26.4  50.7  55.4  68.7  
Electricity  22.6  28.6  16.0  13.4  19.2  13.7  17.2  23.1  45.4  53.5  67.2  
Natural gas  3.6  2.7  4.1  3.0  4.8  2.1  3.2  3.3  5.3  1.9  1.5  
Telecoms  42.8  58.8  52.8  37.7  31.5  49.2  63.2  67.4  74.8  79.2  60.8  
Transport  10.2  10.4  9.7  5.3  8.9  6.2  21.0  34.2  30.5  27.0  21.7  
Airports  0.7  2.5  1.4  0.2  0.8  0.9  5.4  8.6  4.4  2.1  0.1  
Railways  3.7  1.0  1.0  0.2  1.1  0.4  1.5  9.3  3.6  2.1  2.0  
Roads  2.9  4.5  5.7  2.7  4.8  2.9  6.9  10.3  14.8  16.5  15.8  
Seaports  2.9  2.3  1.6  2.2  2.2  2.0  7.2  6.0  7.7  6.3  3.8  
Water and 
sewerage  
8.3  9.1  2.3  1.9  1.8  5.3  2.7  2.8  3.6  2.9  2.0  
Region  
East Asia and 
Pacific  
15.7  22.4  15.6  13.7  22.2  15.8  20.6  20.8  22.7  16.5  15.3  
Europe and 
Central Asia  




49.5  47.8  40.8  23.9  18.1  19.6  23.8  33.4  41.9  48.1  52.0  
Middle East and 
North Africa  
3.5  5.1  4.1  1.6  2.2  8.5  6.7  12.6  12.0  6.0  6.1  
South Asia  6.0  3.8  5.8  7.4  4.4  13.1  15.5  28.7  29.2  33.5  39.9  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
5.9  4.3  6.4  5.0  7.4  5.5  9.7  12.7  12.4  13.6  12.0  
Total  87.4  109.7  84.9  61.3  66.2  76.5  107.4  130.7  159.5  164.4  153.2  
 
Source: World Bank (PPIAF) Private Participation in Infrastructure, PPI Data Update Note 42, December 2010 
http://ppi.worldbank.org/features/December2010/Global-update-note-2010.pdf. 
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